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Diego Garcia: Competing Claims to a Strategic Isle
by Timothy P. Lynch*
I. INTRODUCTION
S oviet intervention in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Angola in the last
decade has been viewed with concern by the U.S. government.1 This
anxiety is heightened by the fact that the Soviet Union is actively seeking
military bases in the Indian Ocean to service its warships. 2 At present,
the Soviets have arrangements with the South Yemen, Ethiopian and
Vietnamese governments to maintain outposts in their territories.3 In re-
sponse to this situation, the U.S. government has expended several hun-
dred million dollars for the purpose of improving its military installations
in Oman, Kenya, Egypt, Somalia and on the island of Diego Garcia.' The
* J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law (1984); B.A., University of
Connecticut.
The author has dedicated this note to Joanne Birnberg, his friend and editor, without
whose support it could not have been written.
' Kaufman, U.S. Naval Buildup is Challenging Soviet Advances in Asia and Africa,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Naval Buildup]. This article
is the first in a series entitled Supremacy at Sea: The Race in the Indian Ocean concerning
U.S. military strategy in the Indian Ocean. See also Ports and Oil Spur Naval Buildup by
U.S. and Soviet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Ports and Oil];
As Armadas Intrude on "Zone of Peace," Region Watches with Mixed Feelings, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 21, 1981, at 8, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as As Armadas Intrude].
2 Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Commander-in-Chief of American forces in the Pacific,
testified before the House Armed Services Committee in February 1981 that: "The Soviets
[are] maneuver[ing] for control over Persian Gulf oil and for access to warm-water ports.
With a large military force in Afghanistan, use of port and air facilities in Ethiopia and
South Yemen and ready access to other ports in the region, the Soviets are developing a
substantial presence around the Indian Ocean." Ports and Oil, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6.
3 In South Yemen, the Soviets make use of the old British port of Aden and an installa-
tion on the island of Socotra in the Arabian Sea. On Ethiopian islands, the Soviet Union has
established bases at Perim, on the mouth of the Red Sea, and in the Dahlak Archipelago.
On the Dahlak islands, the Soviets have reportedly built submarine pens as well as missile
repair and storage silos. U.S. Naval Buildup, supra note 1, at 12, cols. 4-5. In late 1979, the
U.S.S.R. obtained port facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Ports and Oil, supra note 1,
at 12, col. 1. These bases are an effective enchroachment upon the Indian Ocean. In addi-
tion, the Soviets have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain bases on Madagascar and the
Maldives Islands. U.S. Naval Buildup, supra note 1, at 12, cols. 5-6.
4 U.S. Naval Buildup, supra note 1, at 12, col. 6.
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Indian Ocean region has now become an area of primary strategic concern
to the United States.5
The United States maintains a military presence in the Indian Ocean
as a consequence of the United Kingdom's withdrawal of armed forces
east of the Suez a decade ago.' The United States moved into the region
to replace the British as the stabilizing force in the area.7 The major U.S.
naval base in the Indian Ocean is located on the island of Diego Garcia.'
The U.S. government leases this atoll from the United Kingdom.9 The
terms of the treaty allow the U.S. military use of the island until the year
2016.10 Additionally, the agreement contains an extension clause which
could permit the U.S. navy to remain on Diego Garcia until 2036.11
Diego Garcia is a small, oppressively hot island in the Chagos Archi-
pelago. 12 The island's importance arises from its strategic location: Diego
Garcia lies southeast of Sri Lanka and approaches the center of the In-
dian Ocean.' 3 The island is therefore an ideal support facility 4 for tacti-
cal aircraft and ships moving from the Philippines to the Middle East or
Persian Gulf.'5 The American presence on Diego Garcia also serves as a
deterrent to Soviet adventurism in the Indian Ocean.' 6
The country of Mauritius claims ownership of the Chagos Archipel-
ago and seeks to evict the United States from Diego Garcia. 7 Mauritius is
I Id. at 1, col. 5 (opinion of Capt. William Carlson, commander of the aircraft carrier
Midway).
Id. at 12, col. 4.
Id. at 12, col. 6.
8 Id. at 1, col. 5.
Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia, Feb. 25, 1976, United States-United King-
dom, 27 U.S.T. 315, T.I.A.S. No. 8230; Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for De-
fense Purposes, Dec. 30, 1966, United States-United Kingdom, 18 U.S.T. 28, T.I.A.S. No.
6196. See also Naval Communications Facility on Diego Garcia, Oct. 24, 1972, United
States-United Kingdom, 23 U.S.T. 3087, T.I.A.S. No. 7481. This agreement authorized only
the construction of a communications facility on Diego Garcia. Id., 23 U.S.T. at 3088,
T.I.A.S. No. 7481. It was superseded by the 1976 treaty, which allowed substantial expan-
sion of the installation. Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia, supra, 27 U.S.T. at 316-17,
T.I.A.S. No. 8230.
10 Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes, supra note 9, 18
U.S.T. at 31, T.I.A.S. No. 6196.
11 Id.
12 The Chagos Archipelago lies between 40 44' and 7' 39' south, and between 70' 50'
and 720 44' east. A. TOUSSAINT, HISTORY OF MAURITIUS 11 (1977). The total area of these
islands is about 47-/2 square miles. Many are coral atolls covered with coconut palms, while
some of the islands are little more than sand banks. C. WRIGHT, MAURITIUS 166 (1974).
13 A. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12.
1 A naval support facility is a refueling and major repair station for tactical aircraft
and ships. Harrison, Diego Garcia, U.S. NAvAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 55 (Aug. 1979).
10 U.S. Naval Buildup, supra note 1, at 12, col. 3.
See generally B. BLECHMAN & S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR 71-74 (1978).
17 See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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a former British Colony of which the Chagos Archipelago was a part. 8
Prior to the colony's independence, the United Kingdom made an ar-
rangement with the government of Mauritius for new administration of
the island chain."9 Along with three islands from Britain's Seychelles col-
ony,20 the Archipelago was designated the British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory.21 This territory was administered by a separate commissioner and
became a new colonial unit.2 ' The negotiations which resulted in the
transfer of the Chagos Archipelago were conducted in private between
Mauritian leaders and the British Colonial Office."3 The sale was effectu-
ated by an oral agreement between Mauritius and the United Kingdom.2
4
Mauritius contends that this transaction violated international law and
the islands should therefore be restored to Mauritian control.
2
'
The government of Mauritius contends that the negotiations which
culminated in the island transfer were tainted by fraud" and duress."
Therefore, it is asserted that the transaction is void under principles of
customary international law.28 Mauritius also contends that the transfer
constituted a disruption of the colony's territorial integrity.29 As such, the
Mauritians maintain that the transfer violated their right to self-determi-
nation and, therefore, should be regarded as invalid.' 0 The United King-
dom asserts that the transfer negotiations were completed in good faith.3 1
The British also declare that the transfer was voluntarily negotiated be-
tween the two countries and, therefore, was not a violation of self-
determination.2
The government of Mauritius intends to present these issues to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)."3 The scenario which spawned this
controversy is not unique to Mauritius; the Seychelles Islands possess vir-
See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
" UNITED KINGDOM COLONIAL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON MAURITIUs 4 (1965) [herein-
after cited as COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT].
20 The Seychelles Islands are located approximately 940 miles north of Mauritius, be-
tween 30 40' and 60 5' south. A. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 9-10.
21 COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19.
22 Id.
3 A. SIMMONS, MODERN MAURITIus: THE POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION 173 (1982).
"1 Id. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
:5 See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
'8 See infra notes 133-40, 154-69 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
: See infra notes 142, 177 and accompanying text.
1, See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
33 N.Y. Times, June 20, 1982, at 10, col. 4.
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tually identical claims.34 Mauritius could potentially advance five conten-
tions in support of its position: (1) self-determination; (2) termination for
breach; 6 (3) duress; (4) error;36 and, (5) fraud. These latter two claims
have never been analyzed by international tribunals.37 An adjudication of
this controversy by the ICJ would have considerable effect on the interna-
tional community.
This comment evaluates the competing claims of Mauritius and the
United Kingdom to the Chagos Archipelago. First, the background of the
controversy will be examined. The manner in which Mauritius obtained
possession of the Chagos Archipelago, and the United Kingdom of Mauri-
tius, will be discussed. The transfer of the Archipelago will be scrutinized
and the claims to the islands will be identified. These claims will be ana-
lyzed in light of the right of self-determination and the customary inter-
national law theories of fraud, duress, error and termination. A proposal
regarding the adjudication of this controversy by the International Court
of Justice will then be presented.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY
Mauritius was uninhabited' before the Dutch arrived and colonized
the island in 1598.s ' This settlement, however, did not prosper and was
abandoned in 1710.40 The French East India Company laid claim to the
island in 1715.41 Their colony flourished, and the company eventually ex-
panded further into the Indian Ocean.42 During the latter part of the
eighteenth century, commercial companies from Mauritius developed the
Chagos Archipelago and other islands in the Indian Ocean.43 These is-
lands became possessions of the French East India Company.4" By 1767,
the company had gone bankrupt and it sold the colony to the King of
France . 5 This sale vested legal title to Mauritius and the Chagos Archi-
34 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The creation of the British Indian Ocean
Territory included the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches which had formerly been
part of the Seychelles. A. TOUSsAiNT, supra note 12, at 90. See also COLONIAL OFFICE RE-
PORT, supra note 19.
35 See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
86 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 134, 189 and accompanying text.
38 B. BENEDICT, MAuRrrus: PROBLEMS OF A PLURAL SocIETY 9 (1965).
89 C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 20.
40 B. BENEDICT, supra note 38, at 9. Abandonment relinquishes all legal claims to a
territory. See infra note 123.
41 C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 21.
42 B. BENEDICT, supra note 38, at 10-11.
48 A. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 44.
44 B. BENEDICT, supra note 38, at 10-11.
45 Id.
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pelago in the government of France.4 s
During the Napoleonic Wars, Mauritius frequently served as a base
of operations against the British in both the Indian Ocean and India.47 In
1810, the British Fleet seized Mauritius from France. 4s The Treaty of
Paris of 1814,'4 which was confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna of 1815,50
gave the United Kingdom legal title to Mauritius and its dependencies. 51
At this time, the Chagos Archipelago had thus become a dependency of
Mauritius.5
2
The United Kingdom governed Mauritius until the colony was
granted independence on March 12, 1968.5 3 The colony included the is-
land of Mauritius, the islands of Agalega and Rodrigues, and the Chagos
Archipelago.5 4 During November of 1965, the British government negoti-
ated a settlement with Mauritius for the Chagos Archipelago. 5 This set-
tlement was reached at a constitutional conference designed to prepare
the colony for independence.5 The elected representatives of Mauritius
agreed to transfer the Chagos Archipelago to the United Kingdom in re-
turn for £3 million (U.K.).5 7 The transaction was concluded orally be-
46 Occupation of a territory that has been abandoned establishes a legal claim under
customary international law. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1030-61 (1963),
47 The settlement of the Caribbean had driven many pirates eastward into the Indian
Ocean. A great deal of these buccaneers settled on Mauritius and the nearby islands. The
wars with Great Britain encouraged privateering against British merchantmen. Between the
years 1793 and 1802 over £2 million in pirated booty passed through Mauritius' capital of
Port Louis. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 24.
48 W. MATHIESON, BRITISH SLAVE EMANCIPATION 1838-1849, at 208 (1967); W. SIMNmTT,
THE BRITISH COLONIAL ElMPiRE 138 (1942).
49 Definitive Treaty of Peace and Amity, May 30, 1814, 63 Parry's T.S. 171-97.
" Territorial Treaty, May 20, 1815, 64 Parry's T.S. 309-21. At this time the United
Kingdom re-ceded many islands back to France because they were considered worthless as
military bases. One of these was the island of Reunion, 100 nautical miles from Mauritius.
Id. at 309-21; A. ToussANT, supra note 12, at 6, 59. Britain retained full sovereignty over
Mauritius and the Seychelles which were governed as the same colonial unit until the early
twentieth century. Id. at 79.
5, A dependency is a "geographically separate territorial unit under the jurisdiction of
but not formally annexed by a nation." WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
604 (1971).
52 C. CARRINGTON, THE BRITISH OVERSEAS 635 (1950).
'3 Smith, Mauritius: Constitutionalism in a Plural Society, 31 MOD. L. REV. 601
(1968).
I Agalega and Rodrigues are both dependencies of Mauritius today. Agalega is 580
miles northwest of Mauritius, and Rodrigues is 360 miles east. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at
166-67.
:5 COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19.
A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 173.
8 Id. The University of Mauritius was founded with the help of this money and a gift
of £3000 worth of books from the British government. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 62.
Compensation was also provided to the private interests involved. The transfer of the
1984 NOTE
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tween the British Colonial Office and Mauritius." Therefore, there is no
record of the sale conferences and there was no exchange of documents. 9
The day after the transfer was announced, a Mauritian political party
withdrew from the country's coalition government in protest.60 The
party's leader explained that while they were "not against the principle of
the transfer of the Chagos Archipelago for the purpose in view, they con-
sidered that Mauritius should have obtained better compensation."61
The transfer was condemned by a resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly.6 2 The resolution was adopted on the advice of the
Special Committee appointed to implement the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,6 3 and de-
clared the event a violation of Mauritius' territorial integrity.6 4 General
Assembly disapproval of the transaction was repeated in 196665 and
1967.66 When Mauritius became independent in 1968, the question was no
longer considered.6 7 The Special Committee was concerned only with
non-self-governing and trust territories and therefore discontinued moni-
toring this situation when the colony achieved nation status.6 8 The Spe-
cial Committee's final report on Mauritius reiterated disapproval of the
Chagos Archipelago displaced about 1600 people living on Diego Garcia. The United King-
dom provided the equivalent of $1.5 million for their welfare. As it became evident that this
amount was insufficient, another settlement, the equivalent of $7.24 million, was negotiated
with the Mauritian government in 1981. N.Y. Times, supra note 33, at 10, col. 3.
58 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23.
59 Id.
eo COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19; A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 173-74.
6 COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19. See also infra notes 115-18 and accompany-
ing text.
2 G.A. Res. 2066, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6160 (1965).
63 This committee, created by General Assembly Resolution 1654, is composed of Aus-
tralia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tu-
nisia, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. G.A.
Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 65, U.N. Doc. AlL. 336 and Add. 1-3 (1961).
The committee monitors and reports on the progress of all trust and non-self-governing
territories' movement toward independence. Id.
61 G.A. Res. 2066, supra note 62. The resolution stated that any step taken by the
administering power to detach islands from the colony for the purpose of establishing a
military base would be in contravention of paragraph six of Resolution 1514. Id. See infra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text. Paragraph six of Resolution 1514 reads: "Any attempt
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions." G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L. 323 and Add. 1-
6 (1960). For a discussion of the binding effect of a General Assembly resolution, see infra
note 108 and accompanying text.
61 G.A. Res. 2232, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/6628 (1966).
'6 G.A. Res. 2357, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 55, U.N. Doc. A17013 (1967).
67 See supra note 63.
68 Id.
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transaction. 9 The Special Committee continued to consider the question
of the British Indian Ocean Territory with regard to the Seychelles Is-
lands until 1972.70 Each year from 1968 to 1972, the General Assembly,
on the advice of the Special Committee, adopted a resolution deploring
the severance of a territory and the construction of military bases in the
Indian Ocean.
71
The chief negotiator for Mauritius at the transfer conference became
the country's first Prime Minister in 1968.72 His party governed Mauritius
until he was voted out of office in 1982.73 Throughout the 1970's, the own-
ership of Diego Garcia was an important Mauritian campaign issue.7 Op-
position parties accused the government of encouraging nuclear war by
permitting the installation of military facilities on the island.7 5 In June of
1982 the Movement Militant Mauricien (MMM) was overwhelmingly
elected to power in Mauritius.7 6 Unlike the preceding pro-western govern-
ment, the MMM favors neither U.S. nor Soviet policy, but is instead
closely aligned with the New Delhi-initiated movement to turn the Indian
Ocean into a demilitarized zone.7 7 This "zone of peace" movement seeks
the removal of all foreign military personnel from the area. s One of the
MMM's campaign promises was to evict the U.S. Navy from Diego Garcia
69 23 U.N. GAOR C.4 (1791st mtg.) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/7200/Rev. luCh. XI (1968).
70 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
71 G.A. Res. 2984, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 85, U.N. Doc. A/8955 (1972); G.A.
Res. 2869, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 103, U.N. Doc A/8616 (1971); G.A. Res. 2709, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/8248 (1970); G.A. Res. 2592, 24 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/7896 (1969); G.A. Res. 2430, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
18) at 64, U.N. Doc. A/7419 (1968). The United Kingdom abstained from voting on these
resolutions and those cited supra notes 62, 65 and 66. For a discussion of the binding effect
of a General Assembly resolution, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
712 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 190-91.
73 N.Y. Times, supra note 33, at 10, cols. 1, 3.
7' Carter, Foreword to A. SIMMONS, MODERN MAURITIUS: THE POLITICS OF DEcOLONIZA-
TION at viii (1982); A. MANNICK, MAURITIUS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLURAL SOCIETY 161
(1979); L. RIVIERE, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF MAURITIUS 36 (1982); A. SIMMONS, supra note
23, at 191; As Armadas Intrude, suprai note 1, at 8, col. 5.
7 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 191.
78 N.Y. Times, supra note 33, at 10, col. 1.
77 Id. at 10, col. 4. The MMM has already announced plans to close Port Louis, the
capital of Mauritius, to both U.S. and Soviet warships. As Armadas Intrude, supra note 1,
at 8, col. 5. This is by no means a token gesture as the city is a favorite liberty spot and
American sailors spend literally millions of dollars there every year. McDowell, Crosscur-
rents Sweep a Strategic Sea, 160 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 442 (1981).
78 This movement was responsible for the United Nations' Declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a zone of peace. As Armadas Intrude, supra note 1, at 8, cois. 2-3. This resolution
called upon the superpowers to remove all warships and military aircraft from the area. G.A.
Res. 2832, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 23) at 105, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). The United
States abstained from voting on this resolution. For a discussion of the binding effect of a
General Assembly resolution, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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in furtherance of this goal."
The MMM claims that historically the Chagos Archipelago is Mauri-
tian Territory,s° and that the islands were wrongfully taken from Mauri-
tius.s" The United Kingdom contends that no such historical basis existss2
and that the transfer resulted from free negotiation. 3 These claims will
now be considered in light of the international right of self-determination
and principles of customary international law.
III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE COMPETING CLAIMS
A. Self-Determination
The principle of self-determination holds that all peoples have the
inalienable right to freely pursue political, economic, social and cultural
development.8 4 Recognition of this principle is enumerated in the United
Nations Charter as a fundamental purpose of the organization. 5 The doc-
trine of self-determination has developed considerably in the past three
decades.88 This development is reflected by the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution
1514).8' The General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 in 1960 as a con-
demnation of colonialism in all forms.88 This declaration reaffirmed the
doctrine of self-determination and deplored "[a]ny attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a
country." ' Today, the doctrine of self-determination is recognized as a
rule of international law. 0
Mauritius contends that the creation of the British Indian Ocean
Territory was a violation of territorial integrity.8" The country's chief ne-
gotiator at the transfer conference claims that the settlement was not a
product of open bargaining."2 This contention is supported by the Gen-
79 As Armadas Intrude, supra note 1, at 8, col. 5; Carter, supra note 74.
80 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-94, 139-41, 168-70 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103-04, 177 and accompanying text.
84 R. HINGORANI, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1979).
85 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. This principle is reiterated in Article 55. U.N. CHARTER
art. 55.
88 See generally W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1977); A. SURDEA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(1973).
87 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 64.
88 Id.
89 Id.
80 W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 86, at 147.




eral Assembly's resolutions condemning the British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory as a disruption of territorial integrity.9 3 The MMM asserts that since
a disruption of territorial integrity is violative of a colony's self-determi-
nation, the transfer is void.9 4 If the creation of the British Indian Ocean
Territory was a disruption of Mauritius' territorial sovereignty, then it
was a violation of the colony's self-determination. If this scenario is the
case the transaction would be void.9
The United Kingdom contends that the creation of the British In-
dian Ocean Territory did not involve the disruption of natural territorial
units.9 7 The term natural territorial units is not defined by Resolution
1514,98 and the British submit that it was not intended to include islands
1200 miles apart.9 9 The United Kingdom maintains that the island chain
was essentially a commercial venture and had been uninhabited when the
British acquired possession of the colony. 00 The British further contend
that Mauritius and the Archipelago were administered as the same colo-
nial unit merely for convenience. 1' 0 The United Kingdom therefore as-
serts that Mauritius has no natural connection with the Chagos Archipel-
ago.10 2 The United Kingdom also maintains that the transfer settlement
was an agreement negotiated with the elected representatives of Mauri-
tius.1' 0 The British contend that such a freely-negotiated settlement is
not a violation of self-determination." 4 If the creation of the British In-
dian Ocean Territory was not a disruption of Mauritian territorial integ-
rity, then it was not a violation of the colony's right of self-
determination. 0 5
The United Kingdom has the more persuasive argument on this is-
sue. Mauritius asserts that the transfer settlement was forced upon the
colony, 0 6 as evidenced by the General Assembly's resolutions condemning
93 See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
95 Id.
" See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
- 20 U.N. GAOR C.4 (1558th mtg.) at 240, U.N. Doc. A/6000IRev.1, Ch. XII (1965).
:8 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 64.
9 Supra note 97.
200 Id. See also A. ToussANT, supra note 12, at 66; C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 166-
67. The inhabitants of Diego Garcia arrived some time after the British gained control of
the Chagos Archipelago. They were laborers imported from Mauritius to work on a coconut
plantation. N.Y. Times, supra note 33, at 10, col. 1.
,"' Questions Relating to Trust and Non Self-Governing Territories and the Declara-
tion on Granting Independence, U.N.Y.B. 531, 586 (1965).
"02 See supra note 97.
103 Id.
104 Id.
05 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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the transfer.107 These resolutions are only the opinion of a majority of the
General Assembly.'08 They were adopted upon the advice of the Special
Committee established to implement Resolution 1514.109 This resolution
is designed to end colonialism ' and deplores pre-independence sever-
ances of territory."' The policy underlying this condemnation is that all
peoples possess the right to determine their own economic
development."1
2
The United Kingdom contends that the transfer was the result of
open negotiation between the Colonial Office and the elected representa-
tives of Mauritius.'1s The British position is supported by the negotiation
process and the events which transpired following it."4 No charges of
over-reaching were made against the United Kingdom until Diego Garcia
became a controversial Mauritian political issue in the mid-1970's. 15
Events of the period suggest that it was politically unwise to support the
transfer." The only protest to the transfer in 1965 was made by a Mauri-
tian political party which felt that the country had been inadequately
compensated."17 The remainder of Mauritius' five-party government,
107 See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
108 General Assembly resolutions are an expression of a majority of the organization's
opinion on a particular issue. Members who are in disagreement with a resolution, or refrain
from voting on it, are not bound by the opinion. L. GOODRICH, THE UNrran NATIONs 282
(1959). The United Kingdom refrained from voting on any of these resolutions. See supra
notes 62, 65, 66 and 71. Therefore, the British cannot be deemed to have acquiesced to
Mauritius' claim that the colony's right to self-determination was violated.
109 See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
110 The preamble to 1514 contains the following language:
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonial-
ism in all its manifestations,
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the develop-
ment of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and eco-
nomic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Na-
tions ideal of universal peace,
Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
tional economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and in-
ternational law ....
G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 64.
" Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 reads: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Id.
11I See supra note 110.
113 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
11, See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
215 Id.
116 Id.
'" See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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however, felt that the settlement was appropriate. 118 The Diego Garcians
displaced by the transfer were also adequately compensated by the Brit-
ish government. 1 9 The essence of the right of the self-determination is
the principle that all people have the right to freely determine their polit-
ical and economic development. 2 0 A compensated transfer of territory fa-
vored by the majority of a people's elected representatives is a free deter-
mination of economic development. 2"
In the absence of a treaty or other written agreement, the legality of
territorial acquisition is analyzed under principles of customary interna-
tional law.1 22 Therefore, the competing claims to the Chagos Archipelago
will now be analyzed under the customary international law theories of
fraud, duress, error and termination.
B. Customary International Law
Transfers of territory between nations are referred to as cessions in
international law. 123 Cession may be accomplished in any mode agreeable
to the parties, 24 and there is no requirement that the agreement be in
writing. 25 The only criterion is that the transfer take place "with the full
consent of the Governments concerned."' 2 6 Such agreements are voidable,
or void ab initio, if it can be shown they were concluded as a result of
fraud, 27 duress128 or error. 19 The policy behind this rule is that such con-
sent is not considered voluntary. 3 0 Mauritius contends that if the trans-
fer of the Chagos Archipelago is considered a cession, as the United King-
dom asserts,' 3' then this transaction is void due to fraud and duress. 3 2
These contentions, as well as possible claims of error and termination for
breach, will now be examined.
"8 COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19; A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 173.
'1 See supra note 57.
220 See supra note 110.
121 Id.
"2 W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 400-21 (1971); J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 162-81
(6th ed. 1963); C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 102 (1971); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NA-
TIONS 273-76 (1976); 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 46, at 1028-31.
121 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 46, at 1088.
124 Id.
15 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 445; 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (1971).
16 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 46, at 1088.
12 See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
130 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 442-43; 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 125, at 262-
63.
231 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 141, 170-72 and accompanying text.
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1. Fraud
International legal scholars are in general accord that an agreement
whose negotiation involved fraud is invalid. 3 3 There are no recorded in-
stances of fraud in the history of treaty negotiation. 3 Fears that decep-
tion could be used led to the inclusion of provisions dealing with this
possibility in international treaty conventions. 35
Fraud is defined as a "false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives
and is intended to deceive.' 136 In order to constitute fraud the false rep-
resentation must be made at the time of the actual negotiation process
with knowledge of its falsity.13 7 An unwitting or unintended misstatement
is not actionable as fraud, nor is the mere failure to disclose facts.138
Fraudulent misrepresentations must be substantial in order to void an
agreement.139 Only deliberate misrepresentations, such as the use of inac-
curate maps or documents or false statements as to facts, have the effect
of invalidating an agreement. 140
The MMM contend that the British deceived their country's repre-
sentative by promising that Diego Garcia would only be used as a com-
munications center.' 4 ' The United Kingdom asserts that no firm plans
had been made concerning the Chagos Archipelago in 1965.142 If the Brit-
ish promised that Diego Garcia would only be used for communications
purposes, while intending to make greater military use of the island,
Mauritius was defrauded 43 and the transaction is void. 4 4 However, if no
promises were made, or if the United Kingdom only intended to use the
island for a communications center when it so pledged, the doctrine of
133 W. GOULD, INTERNATIONAL LAW 320-21 (1957); 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 159-60 (1943); G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 442-43; 14 M.WHrFEMAN,
supra note 125, at 262.
134 W. GOULD, supra note 133, at 320; 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 133, at 159-60.
135 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 125, at 266; Draft Convention on Law of Treaties
(with comment), 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 657, 1144-48 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention]. Chief among these is the Vienna Convention, Article 49. 14 M. WHrEMAN,
supra note 125, at 266.
136 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).




I'l A. MANNICK, supra note 74, at 161; L. RwIvRE, supra note 74, at 36; A. SIMMONS,
supra note 23, at 173.
141 COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19.
14. See supra notes 136-37, 139 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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fraud does not apply.'4 5
The United Kingdom's contention that no false representations were
made is more persuasive. The British position is supported by the treaties
between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the uses
of Diego Garcia.1 46 The 1972 treaty authorized only the construction of a
communications center, an anchorage and an airstrip. 147 These are pre-
cisely the facilities which the MMM contend the United Kingdom negoti-
ated in 1965.148 The U.S. development of a full naval support facility was
not sanctioned by the British until 1976.149 The concept of fraud applies
to the actual negotiation process. 50 At the time of the transfer negotia-
tions, a communications center may have been the only use that the
United Kingdom contemplated for Diego Garcia.'' Subsequent military
strategy changes in the Indian Ocean are the reasons for the 1976 expan-
sion of the facility.152 This shift in policy, occurring eleven years after the
transfer of the Chagos Archipelago, could not have been foreseen by the
British government in 1965.'s Under this analysis, the United Kingdom
did not defraud Mauritius because it only intended to construct a com-
munications facility on Diego Garcia when the transfer was negotiated.
2. Duress
Duress is pressure upon the will of another inducing the commission
of an act the person would not ordinarily consider.'5 ' Freedom of consent
is an essential element of a binding international agreement. 55 An agree-
ment is invalid under customary international law when duress has been
brought to bear on one party 56 because such pacts are considered one-
145 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 9.
147 Id.
148 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 173.
149 See supra note 9.
150 See supra notes 133, 137 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 9. See also A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 173.
152 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
,13 Id. Mauritius would have a much stronger claim on this issue had the transaction
been reduced to writing. A treaty or written agreement would be binding on future changed
circumstances. See G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 445. At issue in this discussion is the
claim of fraud in the negotiation process, not the breach of an agreement. See supra note
141 and accompanying text.
154 BLACK'S LAW DiTIONARY, supra note 136, at 452.
155 Draft Convention, supra note 135, at 1148-49.
158 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 133, at 158-59; G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 441-
42; 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 125, at 268-75. This is with the exception of peace treaties
with aggressor states. These treaties are generally imposed on the defeated nation and are
considered unique under international law. J. BRmILY, supra note 122, at 319.
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sided and unfairly negotiated. 57 Traditionally, duress has taken the form
of either threats of violence or the actual use of force.""8 International law
recognizes that duress arises in two situations: (1) when pressure is em-
ployed against the negotiator, and, (2) when pressure is employed against
the state itself.159
The last century has seen many instances of duress in international
relations. 160 The two most prominent examples involve the abdication of
Ferdinand VII of Spain and the establishment of the German protector-
ate over Bohemia in 1939.161 The King of Spain's abdication under pres-
sure from Napoleon is considered the classic example of duress against an
individual. 6 2 Napoleon threatened to have Ferdinand tried for treason
unless he relinquished his throne.'6 3 Following France's defeat at the Bat-
tle of Liepzig, this agreement was universally recognized as invalid.' 64 The
German-Czech Treaty of March 1939 is a striking instance of intimida-
tion against a state. 165 Adolph Hitler extorted the Czechoslovakian presi-
dent's agreement to the treaty with threats of German bombing.6 6 The
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg regarded the situation as
an instance of aggression.1
67
The international legal community has increasingly recognized and
condemned other forms of pressure as well. 68 The United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of Treaties particularly deplored the "threat or use of
pressure in any form, whether military, political, or economic, by any
State in order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the
conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign equal-
ity of States and freedom of consent." 6 9
The weakest contention of Mauritius is that the agreement which re-
linquished control of the Chagos Archipelago is a product of duress.1 9
Specifically, the chief negotiator at the transfer conference subsequently
157 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 441-42.
158 Id.
19 Id.
160 See supra note 156.
"I' G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 442.
162 Id.; W. GOULD, supra note 133, at 323.
113 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 442.
114 Id.; W. GOULD, supra note 133, at 323.
165 W. GOULD, supra note 133, at 321.
I" G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 442.
167 W. GOULD, supra note 133, at 321.
1" See generally Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, 7 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1977).
" Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the
Conclusion of Treaties, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records and Docu-
ments of the Conference (1968-1969) at 285, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/I/Add. 2 (1971).
170 As Armadas Intrude, supra note 1, at 8, col. 5.
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claimed that he had no input into the settlement,M  and that it was
forced upon Mauritius as a condition of independence . 7 2 The traditional
forms of duress involve either actual violence or the threat of abuse.1 73
Mauritius does not claim that the settlement was coerced by violent
means; this transaction is, therefore, not a case of traditional duress.174
Mauritius' claim of duress falls within the Law of Treaties disappro-
bation of political pressure. 1 5 Under the United Nations' analysis, if the
United Kingdom imposed the transfer of the Chagos Archipelago as a
condition for Mauritian independence, the transaction is void ab initio.1 71
The British contend that the settlement was freely negotiated be-
tween the Colonial Office and Mauritius' representatives. 77 If the settle-
ment were a product of open negotiation, the doctrine of duress would
not apply. 7 8
The United Kingdom has the more persuasive argument on this issue
as well. The negotiator claiming duress did not raise this issue until the
mid-1970's.1 1 Ownership of the Chagos Archipelago has been a key
Mauritian political issue for the last decade.8 0 During this period, Mauri-
tius' chief negotiator at the transfer conference was the country's Prime
Minister.' 8 ' As it became politically unwise to support the transfer, the
Prime Minister began to support the ownership claim, stating that the
settlement had been forced on Mauritius.'8 2 Analyzed in this manner,
Mauritius' contention of duress is an unfounded claim, the basis of which
is rooted in the country's internal politics.
3. Error
Mauritius does not contend that the agreement transferring posses-
sion of the Chagos Archipelago is void for error. An analysis of the coun-
try's assertion of fraud, however, reveals the possibility that such a claim
exists.18 3
1 L. RVIRE, supra note 74, at 36.
172 As Armadas Intrude, supra note 1, at 8, col. 5.
173 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
1 Id.
175 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
177 Supra note 97.
178 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
179 L. RwvmRE, supra note 74, at 36.
180 See supra note 74.
1s1 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23.
82 As Armadas Intrude, supra note 1, at 8, col. 5; L. RrvERE, supra note 74, at 36. The
Prime Minister also stated that Mauritius would be willing to continue Britain's policy of
leasing Diego Garcia to the United States. Id.
,83 See supra notes 138, 141-42 and accompanying text.
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Agreements which are concluded as a result of substantial error con-
cerning the facts are voidable under customary international law."' In
order for such error to be excusable, the claimant must not have contrib-
uted to the mistake in any way. 15 An excusable error goes to the root of a
transaction, so that, but for its existence, the mistaken party would not
have made the agreement. 86 This doctrine does not apply if the circum-
stances of a transaction put the state on notice of a possible error. 87 The
only instances in which error has been invoked to rescind or modify an
international agreement have involved incorrect maps and other geo-
graphical descriptions. 88
No cases directly involving the effect of error on an international
agreement have come before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 89
The ICJ's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ),1 9 however, did express a willingness to consider this doctrine. 19'
In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, two judges utilized such an error
analysis. 92 At issue in the proceedings was the ownership and control of
the eastern portion of Greenland. 93 Denmark claimed sovereignty over
the area, while Norway challenged such exclusive possession.18 4 The
Danes relied on statements of the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs
stating that his government acquiesced to Denmark's economic exploita-
tion of Greenland as a recognition of Danish sovereignty. 195 Although the
PCIJ did not feel this declaration amounted to recognition, the statement
was considered an awareness of Denmark's superior interest.'
In his dissent to the PCIJ's judgment in Eastern Greenland, Judge
Vogt felt that the Norwegian Minister was "labouring under a fundamen-
tal and excusable misapprehension.' ' 97 Judge Vogt questioned whether
the Minister knew that Denmark expected exclusive economic possession
of Greenland, and he felt that the promise was invalidated by this er-
1I4 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 443.
185 L. McNAIR, LAw OF TREATIES 211 (1961).
188 Id.
187 Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 48, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 697-98 (1969).
" Draft Convention, supra note 135, at 1127.
189 Id. at 1130.
19s The PCIJ was a creation of the League of Nations. ICJ PUBLICATIONS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976).
191 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53
(Judgment of Apr. 5, 1933).
192 Id. at 92-93; id. at 117-22.
191 Id. at 23.
19 Id. at 44.
195 Id.
1" Id. at 69-73.
19 Id. at 118.
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ror.19 8 Judge Vogt's analysis follows the customary rule that an error is
excusable if it goes to the root of a transaction, and the mistaken party
would not have agreed but for the misconception. 199
Judge Anzilotti also dissented from the PCIJ's opinion, however, he
felt the case was free from error.20 0 Judge Anzilotti wrote:
If mistake is pleaded it must be of an excusable character; and one can
scarcely believe that a government could be ignorant of the legitimate
consequences following upon an extension of sovereignty; I would add
that, of all the governments in the world, that of Norway was the least
likely to be ignorant of the Danish methods of administration in Green-
land . . . .
In applying an error analysis, Judge Anzilotti adhered to the customary
rule that a claimant must not have contributed to the mistake.2 0 2 Thus,
from the foregoing opinions, it is possible that the International Court of
Justice would be willing to apply a customary error analysis.
This error analysis may apply to the Chagos Archipelago agreement.
The MMM claims that Mauritius agreed to the transfer of the islands
because its negotiator believed that the territory would only be used for
communications purposes.2 03 The United Kingdom maintains that it had
no definite plans for the Archipelago in 1965.2 04 If Mauritius believed the
transfer was subject to the provision that Diego Garcia only be used for
communications, while the British were of the impression that no such
condition existed, the agreement would be void for error.20 5 If no such
misunderstanding between the parties occurred, this analysis would not
apply.20 8
An argument that the sale of the Chagos Archipelago did not involve
error would be the more persuasive contention. The United Kingdom's
interest in Mauritius has always been militarily motivated.2 0 7 At the end
of the Napoleonic wars, most captured French territory was returned to
King Louis XVIII. 2°8 The retained islands were kept solely for strategic
reasons.20 9 The United Kingdom's aim was to militarily occupy these is-
198 Id. at 117-22.
I'l See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
200 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 92-93.
201 Id. at 92.
22 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
203 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 173.
2'4 COLONIAL OFFIcE REPORT supra note 19.
20l See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
206 Id.
207 C. CARRINGTON, THE BRITISH OvEnsEAs 256 (1950); A. ToussAneT, supra note 12, at
59.
20 C. CARRINGTON, supra note 207. See also supra note 50.
209 C. CARRINGTON, supra note 207.
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lands in order to provide security for British trade. 1° Mauritius and its
dependencies were retained specifically for this purpose.' British use of
the Archipelago was sporadic,212 but as late as the Second World War,
Diego Garcia was frequently utilized as a refueling and repair station. 12
This type of use is not inconsistent with the U.S. Navy's present facility
on the atoll.2
1 4
In order for a substantial error to be excusable, the nation claiming
mistake must not have been on notice of a possible misconception.21 5
Mauritius was constructively on notice of Britain's use of the Chagos Ar-
chipelago. The history of British use of the Chagos Archipelago clearly
demonstrates that it is a strategic possession, the purposes of which
change with world circumstances.216 To utilize Judge Anzilotti's analysis:
"[Q]f all the governments in the world, that of [Mauritius] was the least
likely to be ignorant of the [United Kingdom's uses of Diego Garcia]. 21 7
Mauritius was in a position to know that the United Kingdom's conceiva-
ble uses of Diego Garcia could be greater than communications 28 and was
therefore on notice of possible error. Under this analysis, the Mauritians
would be precluded from advancing a claim of error, as they contributed
to the mistake by being on notice and falling to act appropriately.2 '
4. Termination
If the negotiations which resulted in the transfer of the Chagos Ar-
chipelago did not invalidate the transaction, Mauritius may argue that
the United Kingdom breached the agreement. The breach of a fundamen-




21 Id.; A. ToussANrr, supra note 12, at 59. This situation has been referred to as a case
of "passive imperialism" because Britain had no real use for the islands. The country's main
aim was to prevent France from using them to launch attacks on India. Id.
12 A. ToussAINT, supra note 12, at 66.
2IS Harrison, supra note 14, at 54.
214 See supra note 14.
2 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
219 An appropriate act would have been a clarification that Diego Garcia always be used
for communications purposes and a reduction of the agreement to writing. See supra note
153.
"9 M. SORENSON, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (1968). A fundamental
element is an essential provision of the agreement, the violation of which renders the trans-
action voidable at the discretion of the other party. W. LEvI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw 230 (1979). Breach of a fundamental element of an international agreement is one of
six ways an accord can be terminated. Termination may also result from: (1) the terms of
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Mauritius contends that the United Kingdom agreed to use Diego
Garcia solely for communications purposes.221 The Mauritians assert that
this condition was a fundamental element of the transaction. 2 The Brit-
ish subsequently allowed the United States to make more extensive use of
the island.223 If the United Kingdom promised to construct only commu-
nications facilities on Diego Garcia, expansion of the installation into a
naval support facility was a breach of the sale agreement.22' The transac-
tion would therefore be voidable at the will of Mauritius.225
The British have a more advantageous position on the issue. The
United Kingdom claims that it had no firm plans for Diego Garcia when
the Chagos Archipelago was purchased. 226 If there were no conditions on
the sale agreement, the transaction was concluded with Britain's £3 mil-
lion payment for the archipelagos 227 and title to the islands passed to the
United Kingdom.2
28
Cession agreements are concluded when the purchasing state pays for
the territory.229 Title to the area is then transferred and the agreement is
terminated. 230 The transaction is evidenced by the documents which con-
cluded the sale.231 Although a written instrument is not required to cede
territory, 232 documentation is preferable to a verbal agreement. 23 3 Written
agreements are an invaluable aid to the determination of subsequent dis-
putes.234' There is no documentation of the transfer of the Chagos Archi-
pelago.2 35 Consequently, the actual understandings of the parties is a dis-
puted issue of fact.23 6 Therefore, Mauritius must prove, first, that a use
agreement was made with the United Kingdom, and, secondly, that this
accord was to bind the British indefinitely.
Mauritius' position is supported by the 1972 United Kingdom-United
the agreement; (2) an explicit or tacit understanding of the parties; (3) a change in the
fundamental circumstances; (4) impossibility of performance; or (5) the extinction of one of
the parties. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 447-50.
2 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
222 Id.
212 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. See also supra note 9.
22, See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
225 Id.
226 COLONIAL OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19.
See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
2, See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
129 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 447.
220 Id.
221 Id.
21 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
223 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 122, at 445.
2- Id. at 445, 447.
225 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
236 A. SIMMONS, supra note 23.
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States treaty which authorized only the construction of a communications
center. 237 This agreement could be interpreted as proof of Britain's al-
leged promise to Mauritius. 23 s Assuming that the 1972 treaty is so con-
strued, Mauritius must then prove that this condition was intended to be
permanent. Without a written treaty or memoranda of the transaction,
this proof will depend upon oral testimony.
239
The MMM's position is weakened considerably by statements of
Mauritius' former Prime Minister,24 ° the chief negotiator at the transfer
conference in 1965.241 The ownership of Diego Garcia was an important
Mauritian political issue throughout the 1970'S.242 During this period, the
Prime Minister began to support the claim that the Chagos Archipelago
is Mauritian territory.24 However, he also stated that Mauritius would
allow the U.S. naval facility to remain on Diego Garcia so long as rent was
remitted to the Mauritian government.2 4 If a covenant on Diego Garcia
existed, this statement could be interpreted as either renunciation or rec-
ognition that it had expired. Other interpretations of this situation are
possible,241 5 but the burden of pleading and proof rests on Mauritius.24
Proof of a covenant on Diego Garcia would be an extremely onerous task
without a written promise.2 47 Therefore, termination for breach would not
be a strong argument for Mauritius.
IV. PROPOSAL
The government of Mauritius intends to present its claim to the
Chagos Archipelago to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).24s The
ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.249 The ICJ is
open to all states which are parties to the Statute of the Court2 50 and is
237 Naval Communications Facility on Diego Garcia, supra note 9.
I'l See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 182.
241 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
244 Id.
245 See supra notes 141, 170-72, 203-05 and accompanying text.
246 ICJ PUBLICATIONS, supra note 190, at 43-54.
1,7 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
248 N.Y. Times, supra note 33, at 10, col. 4.
249 U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
20 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 35 [hereinafter cited as STAT-
UTE OF THE I.C.J.]. States which are not members of the United Nations may litigate in the
ICJ if they accept the conditions set out by the General Assembly on the recommendations
of the Security Council. All states which are members of the United Nations are parties to
the Statute of the Court. G. ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 45 (1971).
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competent to adjudicate all legal claims brought before it.251 In adjudicat-
ing these claims, the ICJ applies international conventions, international
customs and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
252
To a limited extent, the ICJ will also consider other judicial decisions and
scholarly writings. 253  All judgments of the ICJ are final and
unappealable.2"
Jurisdiction255 is conferred upon the ICJ in two ways.25 1 One method
is by agreement between the nations involved in the dispute.257 There are
no formal requirements governing these agreements. 25 The ICJ has delib-
erately kept this aspect informal to encourage states to utilize the Court
to resolve their disputes.259 The other way in which jurisdiction is con-
ferred is by unilateral declaration. 2 0 Many nations have declared that
they recognize compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in certain legal dis-
putes.261 These are controversies concerning: (1) the interpretation of a
treaty; (2) any question of international law; (3) the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obli-
gation; and, (4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.26 2 Most of these declarations accept
compulsory jurisdiction in an extremely restricted manner.263
The United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council or Gen-
eral Assembly to request the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on any legal
question.2" Advisory opinions are not binding and do not have the force
251 STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art 36.
52 Id. art. 38.
253 Id.
54 Id. art. 60.
255 Jurisdiction is the power of a court to render a binding decision on the merits of a
case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 136, at 766.




260 STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 36(2).
251 See generally S. ROsENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
345-416 (1979).
262 STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art 36(2).
263 S. ROSENNE, supra note 256, at 82-83. Many states accept compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ subject to certain limitations known as reservations. The most common reservation
excludes disputes which are within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, as determined by
the state. Other common reservations limit jurisdiction to disputes arising after a certain
date, to disputes for which a solution is not reached through diplomatic means or for which
the parties have not agreed upon another method of settlement, and exclude disputes relat-
ing to events occurring in time of war. Id. at 82.
26 U.N. CHARTER art. 96. Article 96 also authorizes "[o]ther organs of the United Na-
tions and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General As-
sembly" to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising out of the scope of their
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of law.2 s5 These opinions are persuasive, however, and states are unlikely
to act contrary to them.6 8
Mauritius is a member of the United Nations, 2 7 as is the United
Kingdom.2 8 Therefore, both states may litigate in the ICJ.2 9 Both states
must, however, consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction.27 0 Mauritius has indi-
cated a willingness to have this controversy adjudicated by the ICJ.271
The United Kingdom has been silent on this issue. Great Britain has
made a unilateral declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ.272 This declaration is extremely narrow and retains the right to
amend or withdraw any reservations.2 73 Therefore, utilizing the United
Kingdom's unilateral declaration to compel the British to adjudicate is
not a viable option for Mauritius.7 4
In the event that the United Kingdom does not agree to adjudicate
this controversy, Mauritius could petition the United Nations General
Assembly to request an advisory opinion.2 75 Considering the numerous
resolutions concerning the British Indian Ocean Territory, it is conceiva-
ble that the General Assembly would support such a plan.2 7' Advisory
activities. Id.
286 D. PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 227 (1972).
266 See International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (advisory opinion of
July 11, 1950). Although South Africa refused to implement the Court's opinions, it did
refrain from absorbing the territory. The ICJ declared that such an action would be illegal.
D. PRATAP, supra note 265, at 228.
267 Questions Relating to the United Nations Charter and Membership of the United
Nations, U.N.Y.B. 315-16, 1037 (1968).
286 The United Kingdom is a founding member of the United Nations. Britain filed its
instrument of ratification on October 24, 1945. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EVERY-
ONE'S UNITED NATIONS 6 (9th ed. 1979).
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272 Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court
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Court of Justice, Jan. 1, 1969, United Kingdom-United Nations, 654 U.N.T.S. 335.
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the Government of any other country which is a Member of the British Commonwealth of
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opinions, however, are not legally binding.2 77 Therefore, although this
course of action would bring Mauritius' claim before the ICJ, the binding
decision which the country seeks would not be realized.2 7 8 A final deter-
mination of this controversy could only be accomplished by the agree-
ment of the United Kingdom to submit this case to the ICJ.
279
One means of conferring jurisdiction upon the ICJ is through a spe-
cial agreement between the parties involved.28 0 A special agreement refers
a controversy to the ICJ on a defined issue.28 ' In 1950, a special agree-
ment between the United Kingdom and France requested the ICJ to de-
termine the Legal Status of the Minquiers and Ecrehos Groups.s28 This
special agreement narrowly defined the following issue: "The Court is re-
quested to determine whether the sovereignty over the islets and rocks
(insofar as they are incapable of appropriation) of the Minquiers and
Ecrehos groups respectively belongs to the United Kingdom or the
French Republic. ' 28s A special agreement drawn along these lines would
perfectly define the issue in this controversy.
V. CONCLUSION
The United Kingdom should agree to adjudicate the legal status of
the Chagos Archipelago before the ICJ. The British government's posi-
tion is not highly regarded by the international community in this situa-
tion.284 The United Nations General Assembly has condemned the coun-
try for violating a colony's right to self-determination.2 5 Analyzed in light
of this right to self-determination and under principles of customary in-
ternational law, however, the United Kingdom is in legitimate possession
of the Chagos Archipelago.2 86 A decision by the ICJ in favor of the United
Kingdom would vindicate British possession of the islands; therefore, the
United Kingdom should not hesitate to support its claim.
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282 The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (U.K. v. Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 49 (Judgment of Nov.
17, 1953).
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